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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation from the angle of 
capturing social innovations and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, 
the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicators in principle could be useful in settings 
where the dominant mode of innovation is based on R&D activities. In practice, however, 
both R&D and non-R&D-based modes of innovation are fairly important. IUS, therefore, 
only provides a partial picture. Social innovations can certainly rely on R&D-based 
technological innovations. Their essence, however, tends to be organisational, managerial 
and behavioural changes. The IUS indicators do not capture these types of changes. Second, 
an assessment of the 81 indicators used to compile the Global Innovation Index reveals that 
it would neither be a fruitful effort to rely on those indicators to capture social innovations. 
Third, given the diversity among innovation systems, a poor performance signalled by a 
composite indicator does not automatically identify the area(s) necessitating the most urgent 
policy actions. Only tailored, thorough comparative analyses can do so. Fourth, analysts and 
policy-makers need to be aware of the differences between measuring (i) social innovation 
activities (efforts) themselves, (ii) the framework conditions (pre-requisites, available inputs, 
skills, norms, values, behavioural patterns, etc.) of being socially innovative, and (iii) the 
economic, societal or environmental impacts of social innovations. 
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ii 
Az üzleti célú innovációk mérése: kiterjeszthetjük-e ezeket a 
módszereket a társadalmi innovációk elemzésére? 
 
Havas Attila 
Összefoglaló 
A tanulmány abból a szemszögből tekinti át az üzleti célú innovációk mérésére széles körben 
használt különböző módszereket, hogy azok milyen mértékben (lennének) alkalmasak a 
társadalmi innovációk elemzésére. A tanulmány következtetései szerint: 1) Az Innovációs 
Unió Eredménytábla (Innovation Union Scoreboard, IUS) összeállításához használt 
mérőszámok többsége a K+F alapú innovációs folyamatokat méri. A gyakorlati tudásra 
támaszkodó innovációk azonban legalább ilyen fontosak a vállalatok számára, ezért az IUS 
csak részleges képet ad az innovációs teljesítményről. Bár a társadalmi innovációk K+F 
eredményeket is hasznosíthatnak, a legtöbb esetben a döntő mozzanat egy új működési mód 
bevezetése, illetve az ehhez szükséges szervezeti, vezetési és magatartásbeli változások. Ez 
utóbbiak megragadására nem alkalmasak az IUS mutatószámai. 2) A Globális Innovációs 
Index kiszámításához használt 81 mutató közül egyiket sem érdemes átvenni a társadalmi 
innovációk mérésére. 3) A számított (kompozit) mutatók csak korlátozottan alkalmasak az 
egymástól jelentősen eltérő innovációs rendszerek teljesítményének elemzésére: egy ilyen 
mutató alacsony szintje nem elégséges annak megállapítására, hogy melyik alrendszerben és 
milyen típusú szakpolitikai intézkedés szükséges. Az elégtelen teljesítmény okait és a 
kilábalás lehetőségeit alapos nemzetközi összehasonlító elemzésekkel lehet feltárni. 4) A 
társadalmi innovációk elemzése során is meg kell különböztetni, hogy mi a megfigyelés 
tárgya: (i) az innovációs tevékenységek (erőfeszítések) szintje; (ii) a társadalmi innovációk 
keretfeltételei (az erőforrások, a társadalmi innovációhoz szükséges tudás és gyakorlati 
tapasztalat megléte, az értékrend, a magatartásminták jellege stb.); vagy (iii) a társadalmi 
innovációk gazdasági, társadalmi és környezeti hatása. 
Tárgyszavak: Az innováció evolúciós közgazdaságtana, Üzleti innováció; Társadalmi 
innováció; Az innováció mérése; Összetett (kompozit) mutatók; Eredménytáblák, rangsorok; 
A mérés tárgya 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL): B52, C80, O31, O35, O38, Y10 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic objective of this paper is to review established approaches to capturing and 
measuring various types of innovations from the angle of measuring social innovations. 
Social innovation is defined by the CrESSI project as follows: “The development and delivery 
of new ideas (products, services, models, markets, processes) at different socio-structural 
levels that intentionally seek to improve human capabilities, social relations, and the 
processes in which these solutions are carried out.” It is important to clarify at the outset that 
this paper considers all sorts of business (or: profit-oriented) innovations on the one hand, 
and social (socially-oriented or societal) innovations, on the other, irrespective of their 
nature. In other words, we should take into account not only technological (product, service, 
and process) innovations when discussing profit-oriented innovations, but organisational 
and marketing innovations as well.1 Innovation studies also show that it is more of an 
exception than a rule to introduce technological innovations without organisational 
innovations and in many cases marketing and market innovations are also needed. 
Moreover, the latter ones are vital for the success of the former ones. (Pavitt, 1999; Tidd et 
al., 1997) In particular, radical innovations often create new markets and that is, by 
definition, a market innovation as well. 
In a similar vein, technological innovations, aimed at tackling societal challenges, should 
not be neglected when considering social innovations. Further, most likely certain 
organisational and marketing innovations might also be useful – or even indispensible – to 
achieve societal goals. In sum, we should keep in mind a distinction between the nature of 
innovations (technological, organisational, and marketing) and the goals of innovation 
efforts (business vs. societal purposes). 
Significant progress has been achieved in measuring R&D and innovation activities since 
the 1960s (Grupp, 1998; Grupp and Schubert, 2010; Smith, 2005) with the intention to 
provide comparable data sets as a solid basis for assessing R&D and innovation performance 
and thereby guiding policy-makers in devising appropriate policies.2 Although there are 
widely used guidelines to collect data on R&D and innovation – the Frascati and Oslo 
Manuals (OECD, 2002 and 2005, respectively) –, it is not straightforward to find the most 
                                                        
1 These three types of innovations are defined by the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005), aimed at providing guidelines 
to interpret and measure innovations introduced by businesses. Interestingly, market innovations, that is, 
entering new markets to purchase inputs or sell outputs (not to be confused with marketing innovations) are not 
mentioned by the Manual (although these are parts of the classic description of innovation by Schumpeter, and 
important ones, indeed). Perhaps it would be almost impossible to measure these crucial innovations. Further 
financial innovations are not mentioned either as a separate category. Certain types of financial innovations can 
be interpreted as service innovations (e.g. new financial ‘products’), while others (e.g. e- and m-banking) as new 
business practices, that is, organisational innovations using the definitions presented in the Manual. 
2 “The Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013 gives a comparative assessment of the innovation performance of the 
EU27 Member States and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their research and innovation systems.” (EC, 
2013a: 4) 
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appropriate way to assess R&D and innovation performance. To start with, R&D is such a 
complex, multifaceted process that it cannot be sufficiently characterised by two or three 
indicators, and that applies to innovation a fortiori. Hence, there is always a need to select a 
certain set of indicators to depict innovation processes, and especially to analyse and assess 
innovation performance. The choice of indicators is, therefore, an important decision 
reflecting the mindset of those decision-makers who have chosen them. These figures are 
‘subjective’ in that respect, but as they are expressed in numbers, most people perceive 
indicators as being ‘objective’ by definition. 
For this reason – besides several others – it is important to review how innovation is 
understood in particular models of innovations and analysed by various schools of 
economics. (Section 2) Based on this, two major measurement endeavours, namely the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard and the Global Innovation Index can be assessed in depth. 
(Sections 3-4) Further methodological issues are discussed in Section 5, while conclusions 
are summarised in Section 6. 
 
 
2 MODELS AND ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INNOVATION 
Besides Schumpeter, only a few economists had perceived innovation as a relevant research 
theme in the first half of the 20th century.3 At that time, however, natural scientists, 
managers of business R&D labs and policy advisors had formulated the first models of 
innovations – stressing the importance of scientific research –, and these ideas are still 
highly influential.4 Since the late 1950s, more and more economists have shown interest in 
studying innovation, leading to new models of innovation, as well as an explicit mention of 
innovation in various economics paradigms. The role of innovation in economic 
development, however, is analysed by various schools of economics in diametrically different 
ways.5 The underlying assumptions and key notions of these paradigms lead to diverse policy 
implications. 
 
                                                        
3 This section heavily draws on Section 2 in Havas (2015a). 
4 For further details, see, e.g. Fagerberg et al. (2011: 898) and Godin (2008: 64-66). 
5 The ensuing overview can only be brief, and thus somewhat simplified. More detailed and nuanced accounts, 
major achievements and synthesising pieces of work include Baumol (2002); Baumol et al. (2007); Castellacci 
(2008a); Dodgson and Rothwell (eds) (1994); Dodgson et al. (eds) (2014); Dosi (1988a), (1988b); Dosi et al. (eds) 
(1988); Edquist (ed.) (1997); Ergas (1986), (1987); Fagerberg et al. (eds) (2005); Fagerberg et al. (2012); Freeman 
(1994); Freeman and Soete (1997); Grupp (1998); Hall and Rosenberg (eds) (2010); Klevorick et al. (1995); 
Laestadious et al. (2005); Lazonick (2013); Lundvall (ed.) (1992); Lundvall and Borrás (1999); Martin (2012); 
Metcalfe (1998); Mowery and Nelson (1999); Nelson (ed.) (1993); Nelson (1995); OECD (1992), (1998); Pavitt 
(1999); Smith (2000); and von Tunzelman (1995). 
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2.1 LINEAR, NETWORKED AND INTERACTIVE LEARNING MODELS OF INNOVATION 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The first models of innovation had been devised by natural scientists and practitioners 
before economists showed a serious interest in these issues.6 The idea that basic research is 
the main source of innovation had already been proposed at the beginning of the 20th 
century, gradually leading to what is known today as the science-push model of innovation, 
forcefully advocated by Bush (1945). 
It is worth recalling some of the main building blocks of Bush’s reasoning: 
“We will not get ahead in international trade unless we offer new and more attractive 
and cheaper products. Where will these new products come from? How will we find 
ways to make better products at lower cost? The answer is clear. There must be a 
stream of new scientific knowledge to turn the wheels of private and public 
enterprise. There must be plenty of men and women trained in science and 
technology for upon them depend both the creation of new knowledge and its 
application to practical purposes. (…) 
New products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new 
principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by 
research in the purest realms of science. 
Today, it is truer than ever that basic research is the pacemaker of technological 
progress. In the nineteenth century, Yankee mechanical ingenuity, building largely 
upon the basic discoveries of European scientists, could greatly advance the technical 
arts. Now the situation is different. 
A nation which depends upon others for its new basic scientific knowledge will be 
slow in its industrial progress and weak in its competitive position in world trade, 
regardless of its mechanical skill.” (Bush, 1945, chapter 3) 
 
By the second half of the 1960s the so-called market-pull model contested that reasoning, 
portraying demand as the driving force of innovation. Then a long-lasting and detailed 
discussion started to establish which of these two types of models is correct, that is, whether 
R&D results or market demands are the most important information sources of innovations.7 
Both the science-push and the market-pull models portray innovation processes as linear 
ones. (Figure 1) 
                                                        
6 This brief account can only list the most influential models; Balconi et al. (2010); Caraça et al. (2009); Dodgson 
and Rothwell (1994); and Godin (2006) offer detailed discussions on their emergence, properties and use for 
analytical and policy-making purposes. 
7 It is telling that a recent review of this discussion by Di Stefano et al. (2012) draws on one hundred papers. 
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Figure 1 
Linear models of innovation 
 
Source: Dodgson and Rothwell (eds) (1994), Figures 4.3 and 4.4 (p. 41) 
This common feature has somewhat eclipsed the differences among these models when 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) suggested the chain-linked model of innovation, stressing the 
non-linear property of innovation processes, the variety of sources of information, as well as 
the importance of various feedback loops. (Figure 2) 
Figure 2 
The chain-linked model of innovation 
 
                        Source: Kline and Rosenberg (1986) 
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The chain-link model has then been extended into the networked model of innovation; 
its recent, highly sophisticated version is called the multi-channel interactive learning model. 
(Caraça et al., 2009) (Figure 3) This model 
“has representational purposes and not representative ones, i.e. it does not assume 
that all factors have to be in place for innovation to be realised and successful. Rather, 
it tries to provide a stylised representation of the main classes of variables, and their 
interrelationships, which are involved in the innovation process taking place in a 
wide array of industries. (...) 
Thus, the model is an analytical grid that describes and contextualises elements, but it 
also provides a set of flexible generalisations upon which to base our thinking when 
trying to explain the sources and stages of the innovation process. It points to the 
ubiquitous experience-based learning processes taking place within firms, as well as 
at the interfaces with users, suppliers and competitors.” (Caraça et al., 2009: 864-
866; emphasis added – AH; footnotes are removed from the original) 
Figure 3 
The multi-channel interactive learning model of innovation 
 
Source: Caraça et al. (2009) 
 
2.2 INNOVATION IN ECONOMICS PARADIGMS 
Technological, organisational, managerial changes and opening up new markets had been a 
major theme in classical economics – without using the term innovation. (Havas, 2015b) 
Then neo-classical economics essentially abandoned research questions concerned with 
dynamics, and instead focused on static allocative efficiency. Optimisation was the key issue 
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for this school, assuming homogenous products, diminishing returns to scale, technologies 
accessible to all producers at zero cost, perfectly informed economic agents, perfect 
competition, and thus zero profit. Technological changes were treated as exogenous to the 
economic system, while other types of innovations were not considered at all. Given the 
empirical findings and theoretical work on firm behaviour and the operation of markets, 
mainstream industrial economics and organisational theory has relaxed the most unrealistic 
assumptions, especially perfect information, deterministic environments, perfect 
competition, and constant or diminishing returns. Yet, “this literature has not addressed 
institutional issues, it has a very narrow concept of uncertainty, it has no adequate theory of 
the creation of technological knowledge and technological interdependence amongst firms, 
and it has no real analysis of the role of government.” (Smith, 2000: 75) 
Evolutionary economics of innovation rests on radically different postulates compared to 
mainstream economics.8 The latter assumes rational agents, who can optimise via 
calculating risks and taking appropriate actions, while the former stresses that “innovation 
involves a fundamental element of uncertainty, which is not simply the lack of all the 
relevant information about the occurrence of known events, but more fundamentally, entails 
also (a) the existence of techno-economic problems whose solution procedures are unknown, 
and (b) the impossibility of precisely tracing consequences to actions”. (Dosi, 1988a: 222 – 
emphasis added) Thus, optimisation is impossible on theoretical grounds. 
Availability of information (symmetry vs. asymmetry among agents in this respect) has 
been the central issue in mainstream economics until recently. Evolutionary economics, in 
contrast, has stressed since its beginnings that the success of firms depends on their 
accumulated knowledge – both codified and tacit –, skills, as well as learning capabilities. 
Information can be purchased (e.g. as a manual, blueprint, or licence), and hence can be 
accommodated in mainstream economics as a special good relatively easily and comfortably. 
Yet, knowledge – and a fortiori, the types of knowledge required for innovation, e.g. tacit 
knowledge, skills, and competence in pulling together and exploiting available pieces of 
information – cannot be bought and used instantaneously. A learning process cannot be 
spared if one is to acquire knowledge and skills, and it is not only time-consuming, but the 
                                                        
8 The so-called new or endogenous growth theory is not discussed here separately because its major implicit 
assumptions on knowledge are very similar to those of mainstream economics. (Lazonick, 2013; Smith, 2000) 
Moreover, knowledge in new growth models is reduced to codified scientific knowledge, in sharp contrast to the 
much richer understanding of knowledge in evolutionary economics of innovation. When summarising the 
“evolution of science policy and innovation studies” (SPIS), Martin (2012: 1230) also considers this school as part 
of mainstream economics: “Endogenous growth theory is perhaps better seen not so much as a contribution to 
SPIS but rather as a response by mainstream economists to the challenge posed by evolutionary economics.” 
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costs of trial and error need to be incurred as well.9 Thus, the uncertain, cumulative and 
path-dependent nature of innovation is reinforced. 
Cumulativeness, path-dependence and learning lead to heterogeneity among firms, as 
well as other organisations. On top of that, sectors also differ in terms of major properties 
and patterns of their innovation processes. (Castellacci, 2008b; Malerba, 2002; Pavitt, 1984; 
Peneder, 2010) 
Innovators are not lonely champions of new ideas. While talented individuals may 
develop radically new, brilliant scientific or technological concepts, successful innovations 
require various types and forms and knowledge, rarely possessed by a single organisation. A 
close collaboration among firms, universities, public and private research organisations, and 
specialised service-providers is, therefore, a prerequisite of major innovations, and can take 
various forms, from informal communications through highly sophisticated R&D contracts 
to alliances and joint ventures. (Freeman, 1991, 1994, 1995; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; 
OECD, 2001; Smith, 2000, 2002; Tidd et al., 1997) In other words, ‘open innovation’ is not a 
new phenomenon at all. (Mowery, 2009) 
 
2.3 POLICY RATIONALES DERIVED FROM ECONOMIC THEORIES 
Different policy rationales can be drawn from competing schools of economic thought. 
Mainstream economics is primarily concerned with market failures: the unpredictability of 
knowledge outputs from inputs, the inappropriability of full economic benefits of private 
investment in knowledge creation, and the indivisibility in knowledge production lead to a 
‘suboptimal’ level of business R&D efforts. Policy interventions, therefore, are justified if they 
aim at (a) creating incentives to boost private R&D expenditures by ways of subsidies and 
protection of intellectual property rights, or (b) funding for public R&D activities. 
Evolutionary economics of innovation investigates the role of knowledge creation and 
exploitation in economic processes; that is, it does not focus exclusively on R&D. This school 
considers various types and forms of knowledge, including practical or experience-based 
                                                        
9 Arrow (1962) was already discussing „The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing”, and Rosenberg (1982) 
stressed the importance of learning by using (ch. 6). Recently, learning has become a more regular subject in 
mainstream economics, most notably in game theory. For instance, while „learning” only appeared twice in the 
title of NBER working papers in 1996, it occurred 5 times in 1999, 6 times in 2002, 13 times in 2008, 10 times in 
2013, and 12 times in 2014, among others in the forms of „learning by doing”, „learning from experience”, and 
„learning from exporting” – but also „learning from state longitudinal data systems” and „learning millennial-
style”. (It should be added that at least 15-20 NBER working papers are published a week.) Taking the titles and 
abstracts of articles published in the American Economic Review, „learning” occurred first in 1999, then 2-3 times 
a year in 2002-2006; 4 times in 2008, 2011, and 2012; 5 times in 2013; 6 times in 2007, 2010, and 2014; and 7 
times in 2009. These articles discuss a wide variety of research themes – e.g. behaviour of firms and other 
organisations, business cycles, stock exchange transactions, forecasting of economic growth, mortgage, art 
auctions, game theory, behavioural economics, energy, health, labour market – and modes of learning. Thus, not 
all these articles are relevant from the point of analysing innovation processes (e.g. „learning [one’s] HIV status” 
is not part of an innovation process). Further, in several cases knowledge is narrowed down to patents, which is 
clearly a misconception. Yet, a detailed analysis of the substance of these articles is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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knowledge acquired via learning by doing, using and interacting. As these are all relevant to 
innovation, scientific knowledge is far from being the only type of knowledge required for a 
successful introduction of new products, processes or services, let alone non-technological 
innovations. R&D is undoubtedly among the vital sources of knowledge. Besides in-house 
R&D projects, however, results of other R&D projects are also widely utilised during the 
innovation process: extramural projects conducted in the same or other sectors, at public or 
private research establishments, home or abroad. More importantly, there are a number of 
other sources of knowledge, also essential for innovations, such as design, scaling up, testing, 
tooling-up, trouble-shooting, and other engineering activities, ideas from suppliers and 
users, inventors’ concepts and practical experiments (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. (eds), 2005; 
Klevorick et al., 1995; Lundvall (ed.), 1992; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; Rosenberg, 1996, 
1998; von Hippel, 1988), as well as collaboration among engineers, designers, artists, and 
other creative ‘geeks’. Further, innovative firms also utilise knowledge embodied in advanced 
materials and other inputs, equipment, and software. 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) defines its own set of categories as highly 
important sources of information for product and process innovation: the enterprise or the 
enterprise group; suppliers of equipment, materials, components or software; clients or 
customers; competitors or other enterprises from the same sector; consultants, commercial 
labs or private R&D institutes; universities or other higher education institutes; government 
or public research institutes; conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions; scientific journals and 
trade/ technical publications; and professional and industry associations. All rounds of CIS 
clearly and consistently show that firms regard a wide variety of sources of information as 
highly important ones for innovation, but given space limits, only the 2010-2012 data are 
reported in Figures 4-5.10 
                                                        
10 Data for the 2006-2008 and 2008-2010 periods are presented in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 4 
Highly important ‘business’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2010-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2012 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
 
Figure 5 
Highly important ‘scientific’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2010-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2012 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
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The wide variety of knowledge drawn on in innovation processes is a crucial point to bear 
in mind as the OECD classification of industries only takes into account expenditures on 
formal R&D activities, carried out within the boundaries of a given sector.11 In other words, a 
number of highly successful, innovative firms, exploiting advanced knowledge created 
externally in distributed knowledge bases (Smith, 2002) and internally by non-R&D 
processes, are classified as medium-low-tech or low-tech, just because their R&D 
expenditures are below the threshold set by the OECD. 
In sum, evolutionary economics of innovation posits that the success of firms is largely 
determined by their abilities to exploit various types of knowledge, generated by both R&D 
and non-R&D activities. Knowledge generation and exploitation takes place in, and is 
fostered by, various forms of internal and external interactions. The quality and frequency of 
the latter is largely determined by the properties of a given innovation system, in which these 
interactions take place. STI policies, therefore, should aim at strengthening the respective 
innovation system and improving its performance by tackling systemic failures hampering 
the generation, diffusion and utilisation of any type of knowledge required for successful 
innovation.12 (Edquist, 2011; Foray (ed.), 2009; Freeman, 1994; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999; 
OECD, 1998; Smith, 2000) From a different angle, conscious, co-ordinated policy efforts are 
needed to promote knowledge-intensive activities in all sectors. 
 
 
3 THE INNOVATION UNION SCOREBOARD 
As shown above, firms exploit various types of knowledge for their innovation activities. 
Applying this general observation to the Danish case, and relying on the DISKO survey, 
Jensen et al. (2007) made an elementary distinction between two modes of innovation: (a) 
one based on the production and use of codified scientific and technical knowledge (in brief, 
the ST mode), and (b) another one relying on informal processes of learning and experience-
based know-how (called DUI: learning by Doing, Using and Interacting). 
Following this distinction, the indicators used in the various editions of the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard13 are characterised below, using a rudimentary classification. An indicator 
can be relevant to reflect: 
                                                        
11 The so-called indirect R&D intensity has been also calculated as R&D expenditures embodied in intermediates 
and capital goods purchased on the domestic market or imported. Yet, it has been concluded that indirect R&D 
intensities would not influence the classification of sectors. (Hatzichronoglou, 1997: 5) 
12 In an attempt to systematically compare the market and systemic failure policy rationales, Bleda and del Río 
(2013) introduce the notion of evolutionary market failures, and reinterpret „the neoclassic market failures” as 
particular cases of evolutionary market failures, relying on the crucial distinction between knowledge and 
information. 
13 The Innovation Union Scoreboard originally was called European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS). The EIS and 
IUS indicators have been revised several times since the first edition of the scoreboard, that is, EIS 2002. The 
current name of the scoreboard was introduced in 2010. 
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 only R&D-based innovations 
 mainly R&D-based innovations 
 only non-R&D-based innovations 
 mainly non-R&D-based innovations 
 both types of innovations. 
This rudimentary classification reveals a bias towards R&D-based innovations in the first 
edition of the EIS: 10 indicators were only relevant for R&D-based innovations; 8 could be 
relevant for both types of innovations; and none focused on non-R&D-based innovations.14 
(Table 1) 
                                                        
14 A fairly detailed, partly technical, partly substantive discussion would be needed to refine this simple 
classification.  
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Table 1 
The 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1 Human resources 
New S&E graduates (ISCED 5a and above) per 1000 population aged 
20-29 
X  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) 
X  
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) X  
2 Knowledge creation 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) X  
USPTO high-tech patent applications (per million population) X  
3 Transmission and application of knowledge   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of manufacturing SMEs) b b 
SMEs involved in innovation co-operation (% of manufacturing 
SMEs) 
b b 
Innovation expenditures (% of all turnover in manufacturing) b b 
4 Innovation finance, output and markets 
High technology venture capital investment (% of GDP) X  
Capital raised on parallel markets plus by new firms on main markets 
(% of GDP)i 
X  
Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of all turnover in 
manufacturing) 
b b 
Home internet access (% of all households) b b 
ICT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
Share of manufacturing value-added in high-tech X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the detailed definition of indicators, EC (2002). 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
Three indicators, namely EPO patent applications (per million population), Home internet access (per 100 
population), and Inward FDI stock (% of GDP) were only used for candidate countries. 
i “Parallel stock exchanges focus on high technology sectors.” (EC, 2002: 31) 
The 2014 and 2015 editions of the IUS use 25 indicators, grouped by 8 innovation 
dimensions. (EC, 2014, 2015) Repeating the same exercise shows that the bias towards R&D-
based innovations has been kept: 10 of the most recent IUS indicators15 are only relevant for, 
and a further four mainly capture, R&D-based innovations; seven could be relevant for both 
types of innovations; and a mere four focus on non-R&D-based innovations. (Table 2) 
                                                        
15  There was only a slight change introduced in 2015: the indicator called “Contribution of medium and high-tech 
product exports to the trade balance” was replaced by “Exports of medium and high-technology products as a 
share of total product exports”. This change had no effect on the nature of the indicators, and thus the 2014 
edition of the IUS is not presented here. 
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Table 2 
The 2015 Innovation Union Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Human resources 
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population aged 25-34 X  
Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary 
education 
b b 
Percentage youth aged 20-24 having attained at least upper 
secondary level education 
b b 
Open, excellent and attractive research systems 
International scientific co-publications per million population X  
Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited publications 
worldwide as % of total scientific publications of the country 
X  
Non-EU doctorate studentsi as a % of all doctorate students X  
Finance and support 
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP X  
Venture capital investment as % of GDP x  
Firm investments 
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP X  
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover  X 
Linkages & entrepreneurship 
SMEs innovating in-house as % of SMEs b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % of SMEs b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
Intellectual assets 
PCT patents applications per billion GDP (in PPS€) X  
PCT patent applications in societal challenges per billion GDP (in 
PPS€) (environment-related technologies; health) 
X  
Community trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Community designs per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations as % of SMEs b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations as % of 
SMEs 
 X 
Economic effects 
Employment in fast-growing enterprises in innovative sectors (% of 
total employment) 
b b 
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities (manufacturing and 
services) as % of total employment 
x  
Exports of medium and high-technology products as a share of total 
product exports 
x  
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % total service exports x  
Sales of new to market and new to firm innovations as % of turnover b b 
License and patent revenues from abroad as % of GDP X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation 
i It is a somewhat strict definition of openness, which only takes into account non-EU doctorate students. 
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Again, a fairly detailed, partly technical, partly substantive discussion would be needed to 
refine this simple classification, especially concerning the following issues: to what extent 
upper secondary education, venture capital, employment in knowledge-intensive activities, 
and knowledge-intensive services exports are relevant indicators to capture non-R&D-based 
innovations; and to what extent non-R&D-based innovation activities are needed for 
successful R&D-based innovations? 
The indicators used in the previous editions of the EIS and IUS are characterised in 
Appendix 2 (Tables A1-A7). To give an overview of the evolution of the EIS and IUS 
indicators, results are summarised in Table 3. In sum, the bias towards R&D-based 
innovations has been rather persistent, although there has been some fluctuation. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above considerations for analysing social 
innovation. 
First, while the number and definitions of indicators used to compile the various editions 
of EIS and IUS have changed to a non-negligible extent since 2002, these indicators 
consistently focus on measuring R&D activities (inputs and outputs) and R&D-based 
innovation activities. In other words, they can be relevant in settings characterised 
predominantly by the so-called ST mode of innovation, but significantly less so in other 
settings, characterised by other types of innovation activities. In other words, using the EIS 
or IUS indicators would not help establishing if a certain system is characterised by a low 
level of innovation activities altogether – or a low level of R&D-based innovation activities. 
Yet, that is a fairly important distinction both from an analytical and a practical (policy) 
point of view: these two systems (settings) are fundamentally different. 
Several analysts and policy-makers tend to believe that advanced economies can be 
sufficiently characterised by focussing on the ST mode of innovation, on the one hand, and 
less advanced economies should also attempt to change the sectoral composition of their 
economy by increasing the weight of the so-called high-tech (HT) sectors, on the other. 
These views, however, cannot be corroborated by empirical evidence. 
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Table 3 
The evolution of the EIS and IUS indicators, 2002-2014 
 EIS 2002 EIS 2003 EIS 2004 
EIS 2005 
EIS 2006 
EIS 2007 EIS 2008 EIS 2009 
IUS 2010 
– IUS 2013 
IUS 2014 
IUS 2015 
Indicators reflecting          
  only R&D-based innovations  10 9 9 8 7 8 8 10 10 
  mainly R&D-based innovations  - 3 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 
  both types 8 9 9 12 12 15 16 6 7 
  only non-R&D-based innovations  - - - - - 1 1 4 4 
  mainly non-R&D-based innovations - - 1 1 1 1 1 - - 
Number of indicators 18 21 22 26 25 29 30 24 25 
Source: own compilation 
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Any simple statistical analysis reveals that the so-called high-tech sectors – supposed to 
be drivers of economic development, due to their intense ST mode innovation activities – 
have a fairly low weight either in output or employment. Innovation studies have shown that 
technological innovations can hardly be introduced without organisational and managerial 
innovations. Moreover, the latter ones – together with marketing innovations – are vital for 
the success of the former ones.16 (Pavitt, 1999; Tidd et al., 1997) Further, those companies 
are the most successful ones, which consciously combine the ST and DUI modes of 
innovation. (Jensen et al., 2007) 
Yet, the high-tech myth is so powerful that even those researchers who base their work 
on thorough analysis of facts are taken by surprise when the facts are at odds with the 
widespread obsession with high-tech. A telling example is Peneder’s excellent study on the 
‘Austrian paradox’: 
“On the one hand, macroeconomic indicators on productivity, growth, employment 
and foreign direct investment indicate that overall performance is stable and highly 
competitive. On the other hand, an international comparison of industrial structures 
reveals a severe gap in the most technologically advanced branches of 
manufacturing, suggesting that Austria is having problems establishing a foothold in 
the dynamic markets of the future.” (Peneder, 1999: 239) 
In contrast, evolutionary economics of innovation claims that any firm – belonging to 
either a low- and medium-technology (LMT) or a HT sector – can become competitive in ‘the 
dynamic markets of the future’ if it is successful in combining its own, firm-specific 
innovative capabilities with ‘extra-mural’ knowledge available in distributed knowledge 
bases. In other words, Austrian policy-makers need not be concerned with the observed 
‘paradox’ as long as they help Austrian firms sustain their learning capabilities, and maintain 
thereby their innovativeness. That would lead to good economic performance – irrespective 
of the share of LMT industries in the economy. 
From a different angle, while the bulk of innovation activities in the LMT sectors are not 
based on intramural R&D efforts, these sectors also improve their performance by various 
types of innovations. These firms are usually engaged in the DUI mode of innovation, but 
they also draw on advanced S&T results available through the so-called distributed 
knowledge bases (Robertson and Smith, 2008; Smith, 2002), as well as advanced materials, 
production equipment, software and various other inputs (e.g. electronics components and 
sub-systems) supplied by HT industries. (Bender et al. (eds), 2005; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
(eds), 2005; Hirsch-Kreinsen and Jacobson (eds), 2008; Hirsch-Kreinsen and Schwinge 
(eds) 2014; Jensen et al., 2007; Kaloudis et al., 2005; Mendonça, 2009; Sandven et al., 
                                                        
16 Although it goes without saying that not all technological innovations are based on R&D results, people tend to 
forget this basic fact. Certain organisational, managerial, marketing and financial innovations, in turn, draw on 
R&D results (but usually not stemming from R&D activities conducted or financed by firms). For these two 
reasons it would be a mistake to equate technological innovations with R&D-based innovations. 
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2005; von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005) Thus, demand by the LMT sectors constitutes 
major market opportunities for HT firms, and also provides strong incentives – and ideas – 
for their RTDI activities. (Robertson et al., 2009) 
It is worth recalling that the 2003 EIS report also stressed the importance of the LMT 
sectors, as well as the significance of their innovation activities: 
„The EIS has been designed with a strong focus on innovation in high-tech sectors. 
Although these sectors are very important engines of technological innovation, they 
are only a relatively small part of the economy as measured in their contribution to 
GDP and total employment. The larger share of low and medium-tech sectors in the 
economy and the fact that these sectors are important users of new technologies 
merits a closer look at their innovation performance. This could help national policy 
makers with focusing their innovation strategies on existing strength and overcome 
areas of weakness.” (EC, 2003a: 20) 
Since then, however, these ideas have been given less prominence. No doubt, it would be 
an interesting research question why this is the case, but this paper cannot address this 
issue. More recently, another EC document, namely the 2013 EU Competitiveness Report is 
sending ‘mixed’ messages on these issues. At certain points it reinforces these adverse 
effects: 
„the EU has comparative advantages in most manufacturing sectors (15 out of 23) 
accounting for about three quarters of EU manufacturing output. (…) Of the 15 
sectors with comparative advantages mentioned above, about two-thirds are in the 
low-tech and medium-low tech manufacturing groups. On a positive note though, 
even in those sectors EU competitiveness is based on high-end innovative products.” 
(EC, 2013d: 3-4, emphasis added – AH) 
Is it a negative phenomenon, then, that around 10 EU LMT sectors are internationally 
competitive?!? A more balanced view is also offered: 
“… the policy priority attached to key enabling technologies which lead to new 
materials and products in all manufacturing sectors has a strong potential to 
upgrade EU competitiveness not only in the high-tech sectors but also in the 
traditional industries.” (ibid: 5) 
To sum up the first conclusion, analysts and policy-makers dealing with innovation 
should pay attention to both R&D-based and non-R&D-based innovations. 
The second conclusion: while social innovations can indeed utilise R&D-based 
technological innovations, their essence tends to be organisational, managerial and 
behavioural changes. The EIS and IUS indicators, in turn, do not capture these types of 
changes. 
 
 
4 THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 
The Global Innovation Index (GII) has a significantly broader coverage – compared to the 
IUS – in two respects: it covers well over 100 countries, and considers 81 indicators, 
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arranged in 7 “pillars”. The seven pillars used in the 2014 edition of the GII include: 
Institutions (9 indicators), Human capital and research (11), Infrastructure (10), Market 
sophistication (10), Business sophistication (14), Knowledge and technology outputs (14), 
and Creative outputs (13). The themes considered by each pillar are summarised in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 
Framework of the Global Innovation Index 2014 
 
Source: Global Innovation Index 2014 
To assess the relevance of these 81 indicators, and especially the ‘match’ between the 
themes (or headings) captured by the 7 pillars would require a fairly lengthy paper. In other 
words, the GII indicators are characterised in a somewhat simplified way here. It should be 
stressed that most elements are indices themselves, that is, not ‘stand-alone’ indicators. In 
other words, several methodological weaknesses are likely to remain hidden. 
 
Pillar 1: Institutions 
Pillar 1 is composed of 3 sub-pillars. The political environment sub-pillar incorporates three 
indices with the intention to reflect the following aspects: “perceptions of the likelihood that 
a government might be destabilized; the quality of public and civil services, policy 
formulation, and implementation; and perceptions of violations to press freedom”. 
The second sub-pillar, called regulatory environment, is comprised of two indices to 
capture “perceptions on the ability of the government to formulate and implement cohesive 
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policies that promote the development of the private sector and at evaluating the extent to 
which the rule of law prevails (in aspects such as contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts)”. A third indicator is meant to evaluate “the cost of redundancy 
dismissal as the sum, in salary weeks, of the cost of advance notice requirements added to 
severance payments due when terminating a redundant worker”. 
The third sub-pillar, that is, the business environment one is aimed at summarising three 
aspects directly affecting private entrepreneurial endeavours. It uses the World Bank indices 
“on the ease of starting a business; the ease of resolving insolvency (based on the recovery 
rate recorded as the cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through reorganization, 
liquidation, or debt enforcement/foreclosure proceedings); and the ease of paying taxes”. 
(Cornell University et al., 2014: 45-46) 
Not all the above elements are institutions (“rules of the game”), and not all are directly 
related to innovation processes and performance. It can be argued, though, that the aspects 
(attempted to be) captured by these indices are relevant to characterise the political, 
regulatory and business environment for innovation. Among the important missing 
elements, one should mention legislation on competition,17 as well as the entrepreneurial 
culture in a given country. 
 
Pillar 2: Human capital and research 
Pillar 2 is also comprised of 3 sub-pillars. Sub-pillar 2.1 is composed of several of indicators 
with the intention to capture achievements at the first two levels of education, namely 
elementary and secondary education. Education expenditure and school life expectancy are 
taken as “good proxies for coverage”. Government expenditure per pupil at secondary level is 
meant to indicate “the level of priority given to secondary education by the state”. The quality 
of education is measured via (a) PISA (OECD Programme for International Student 
Assessment) results indicating 15-year-old students’ performances in reading, mathematics, 
and science, as well as (b) the pupil-teacher ratio. 
Sub-pillar 2.2 on tertiary education is designed to measure coverage at this level of 
education. “(…) priority is given to the sectors traditionally associated with innovation (with 
a series on the percentage of tertiary graduates in science and engineering, manufacturing, 
and construction); and the inbound mobility of tertiary students, which plays a crucial role in 
the exchange of ideas and skills necessary for innovation.” 
Sub-pillar 2.3 on R&D is meant to capture the level and quality of R&D activities by using 
the number of researchers (headcounts, per million of population), gross expenditures on 
                                                        
17 The intensity of comepetition is included in Pillar 4. 
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R&D as percentage of GDP, and the quality of scientific and research organisations proxied 
by the average score of the top three universities in the QS World University Ranking as of 
2013. “(…) this indicator aims at capturing the availability of at least three higher education 
institutions of quality within each economy (i.e., included in the global top 700), and is not 
aimed at assessing the average level of all institutions within a particular economy.” (Cornell 
University et al., 2014: 46-47) 
Formal education is a crucial factor determining the quality of human capital, no doubt, 
but life-long learning and other, informal modes of learning are also important. Research is 
conducted outside universities, too, both by other publicly financed research organisations 
and businesses. Moreover, the quality of research conducted by these latter types of 
organisations is not necessarily lower than that at universities. Moreover, university 
rankings themselves suffer from several major methodological weaknesses. Thus, the name 
of this pillar is more ‘ambitious’ than its actual content. 
 
Pillar 3: Infrastructure 
The third pillar on infrastructure is also built by three sub-pillars: information and 
communication technologies (ICT), general infrastructure, and ecological sustainability. 
Sub-pillar 3.1 on ICT is computed by using four indices developed by international 
organisations on ICT access, ICT use, on-line service by governments, and on-line 
participation of citizens. Sub-pillar 3.2 on general infrastructure is composed of “the average 
of electricity output in kWh per capita; a composite indicator on logistics performance; and 
gross capital formation, which consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets and net 
inventories of the economy, including land improvements (fences, ditches, drains); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings”. Sub-pillar 3.3 on ecological sustainability is constructed by using three 
indicators: “GDP per unit of energy use (a measure of efficiency in the use of energy), the 
Environmental Performance Index of Yale and Columbia Universities, and the number of 
certificates of conformity with standard ISO 14001 on environmental management systems 
issued”. (Cornell University et al., 2014: 47) 
Ecological sustainability is certainly an important issue, but it is difficult to grasp why it 
is part of the “Infrastructure” pillar, especially when it is measured by the above three 
components. These are more relevant to reflect those environmental challenges that are to be 
addressed by innovation efforts – or the outcome of previous eco-innovation efforts. In other 
words, there is a certain mismatch between the name of this pillar and its actual content. 
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Pillar 4: Market sophistication 
The fourth pillar on market sophistication integrates three sub-pillars “structured around 
market conditions and the total level of transactions”. Sub-pillar 4.1 on credit intends to 
reflect “the ease of getting credit aimed at measuring the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws facilitate lending by protecting the rights of borrowers and lenders, as well 
as the rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope, and accessibility of credit 
information”. Transactions are measured by the total value of domestic credit to the private 
sector (as a percentage of GDP) as well as by the gross loan portfolio of microfinance 
institutions (as a percentage of GDP) with the intention to make the method applicable to 
emerging markets, too. 
Sub-pillar 4.2 on investment is composed of the ease of protecting investors index and 
three indicators on the level of transactions. Besides stock market capitalisation, the total 
value of shares traded (as percentage of GDP) is also taken into account to show if market 
size is matched by market dynamism. Data on venture capital deals (a total of 18,860 deals 
in 71 countries in 2013) are also exploited. 
Sub-pillar 4.3 considers trade and competition. The market conditions for trade are 
measured by two indicators: the average tariff rate weighted by import shares and a metric 
on non-agricultural market access conditions to foreign markets (five major export markets 
weighted actual applied tariffs for non-agricultural exports). The last indicator is a result 
from a survey: the intensity of competition in local markets. “Efforts made at finding hard 
data on competition have so far proved unsuccessful.” (Cornell University et al., 2014: 48) 
 
Pillar 5: Business sophistication 
The fifth pillar is intended to capture the level of business sophistication to assess “how 
conducive firms are to innovation activity”. Sub-pillar 5.1 on knowledge workers is built by 
four indicators: employment in knowledge-intensive services; the availability of formal 
training at the firm level; R&D performed by business enterprise (BERD) as a percentage of 
GDP; and the percentage of gross expenditures of R&D (GERD) financed by businesses. 
Further, it includes an indicator taken from the Graduate Management Admission Test 
(GMAT). “The total number of GMAT test takers (scaled by population aged 20 to 34 years 
old) [was] taken as a proxy for the entrepreneurial mindset of young graduates.” 
Sub-pillar 5.2 on innovation linkages exploits data on business-university R&D 
collaborations, “the prevalence of well-developed and deep clusters”, the ratio of GERD 
financed from abroad, and “the number of deals on joint ventures and strategic alliances. 
The latter covers a total of 2,978 deals announced in 2013, with firms headquartered in 127 
participating economies. In addition, the total number of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 
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and national office published patent family applications filed by residents in at least three 
offices is included this year to proxy for international linkages.” 
“The rationale behind sub-pillars 5.3 on knowledge absorption (an enabler) and 6.3 on 
knowledge diffusion (a result) — two sub-pillars designed to be mirror images of each other 
— is precisely that together they will reveal how good countries are at absorbing and 
diffusing knowledge. Sub-pillar 5.3 includes four statistics that are linked to sectors with 
high-tech content or are key to innovation: royalty and license fees payments as a percentage 
of total trade; high-tech imports (net of re-imports) as a percentage of total imports; imports 
of communication, computer and information services as a percentage of total trade; and net 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP.” (Cornell University et al., 
2014: 48-49; some obvious mistakes are corrected – A.H.) 
The name of this pillar is not explained, although it does not seem to be self-explanatory. 
It is not clear, either, why firms should be conducive to innovation activity. Usually analyses 
have a different logic: market and regulatory conditions, that is, factors external to the firms, 
can be conducive for – or hamper – innovation activities performed by businesses. Further, 
it is difficult to accept the ratio of GMAT test takers “as a proxy for the entrepreneurial 
mindset of young graduates”. The name of sub-pillar 5.2 (innovation linkages) only partially 
matches its components, of which two concern R&D activities, and a third one (on patents) is 
also more relevant to characterise R&D activities than reflect innovation activities. Data on 
high-tech imports can only partially reflect knowledge absorption. 
 
Pillar 6: Knowledge and technology outputs 
The sixth pillar – just as all the previous ones – is composed of 3 sub-pillars. Sub-pillar 6.1 
on knowledge creation “includes five indicators that are the result of inventive and 
innovative activities: patent applications filed by residents both at the national patent office 
and at the international level through the PCT; utility model applications filed by residents at 
the national office; scientific and technical published articles in peer-reviewed journals; and 
an economy’s number of articles (H) that have received at least H citations”. 
Sub-pillar 6.2 on knowledge impact is meant to measure “the impact of innovation 
activities at the micro- and macro-economic level or related proxies: increases in labour 
productivity, the entry density of new firms, spending on computer software, and the 
number of certificates of conformity with standard ISO 9001 on quality management 
systems issued”. The indicator on high- and medium-high-tech industrial output over total 
manufactures output is for the first time in this edition of the GII. 
Sub-pillar 6.3 on knowledge diffusion “is the mirror image of the knowledge absorption 
sub-pillar of pillar 5. It includes four statistics all linked to sectors with high-tech content or 
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that are key to innovation: royalty and license fees receipts as a percentage of total trade; 
high-tech exports (net of re-exports) as a percentage of total exports (net of re-exports); 
exports of communication, computer and information services as a percentage of total trade; 
and net outflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP.” (Cornell University et al., 2014: 49-50) 
The first sub-pillar is meant to be composed of indicators on “the result of inventive and 
innovative activities”. Yet, most of these indicators are relevant to characterise R&D (and 
not innovation) activities. As for the knowledge impact sub-pillar, only one of the five 
components is related to knowledge impacts, and even that one is only partially: reflecting 
the impact of certain types of knowledge. As for knowledge diffusion, all the four 
components of that sub-pillar can indicate knowledge diffusion outside a given country (with 
certain limitations), and thus none of these seems to be relevant to characterise knowledge 
diffusion inside a given country. 
 
Pillar 7: Creative outputs 
The seventh pillar is also composed of 3 sub-pillars. The first one on intangible assets 
includes data on trademark applications by residents at the national office; trademark 
applications under the Madrid System by country of origin, and results obtained via two 
survey questions on the use of ICTs by businesses. 
Sub-pillar 7.2 on creative goods and services is aimed to capture creativity and the 
creative outputs of an economy by using five indicators: cultural and creative services 
exports, including information services, advertising, market research and public opinion 
polling, and other personal, cultural, and recreational services (as a percentage of total 
trade); national feature films produced in a given country (per capita count); global 
entertainment and media output (per capita); printing and publishing output (as a 
percentage of total manufactures output); and creative goods exports (as a percentage of 
total trade). 
Sub-pillar 7.3 on online creativity is composed of four indicators, all by population aged 
15–69 years: generic (biz, info, org, net, and com) and country-code top level domains, 
average monthly edits to Wikipedia, and video uploads on YouTube. “Attempts made to 
strengthen this sub-pillar with indicators in areas such as blog posting, online gaming, the 
development of applications, and have so far proved unsuccessful.” (Cornell University et al., 
2014: 50-51) 
It is not clear why “the use of ICTs in business and organizational models” is an output 
indicator. Only a small fraction of printing and publishing output is a creative output, with 
the bulk being the paper and other printing costs. It would be really costly to establish what 
portion of video uploads on YouTube can be regarded creative output. 
 
 
24 
In sum, the GII is a remarkable effort both in terms of its geographic and thematic 
coverage, but it suffers from severe weaknesses concerning business innovation activities. 
In several cases there is a non-negligible mismatch between the ‘headline’ notions (pillars 
and their sub-pillars) and the actual components (indices or indicators) selected. Just as in 
the case of the EIS and IUS indicators, there is a bias towards R&D-based (ST mode) 
innovations, and thus the DUI mode is eclipsed. It is even worse when R&D and innovation 
are conflated. As for describing and assessing social innovations, it would be difficult to use 
any of the 81 GII indicators as a relevant one. 
 
 
5 FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
5.1 DEGREE OF NOVELTY, UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
A standard question in innovation surveys relates to the degree of novelty. A given 
innovation can be new to the firm, to the market (in a given country) or to the world. For 
pragmatic reasons, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) uses only the first two 
categories: it would be too difficult to judge by the respondents – and subsequently check by 
experts – if a given innovation is new to the market in a given country or to the world. Of 
course, in rare cases, e.g. when the first digital camera, mobile phone or tablet is introduced, 
it is easier to establish that a certain product is new to the world, but even in these 
exceptional cases there could be some difficulties to establish which product variation (by 
which company) has been introduced first – and successfully. 
This issue is closely related to the classification of innovations. In qualitative analyses the 
following categories can be used. New goods (that is, products or services) might represent 
an incremental or a radical change (innovation). If we consider further units (levels) of 
analysis we can also think of innovations at the level of technology systems, that is, a set of 
technologically and economically interconnected goods and processes, affecting several 
companies or an entire sector at the same time, occasionally leading to the emergence of new 
industries (e.g. canals, gas and electric light systems, plastic goods, electric household 
devices). Being dissatisfied with the notion of ‘long waves’ used in analysing business cycles 
(mainly by Kondratiev and Schumpeter), Freeman and Perez have elaborated on the notion 
of techno-economic paradigms, that is, 
“the set of the most successful and profitable practices in terms of choice of inputs, 
methods and technologies, and in terms of organisational structures, business models 
and strategies. These mutually compatible practices, which turn into implicit 
principles and criteria for decision-making, develop in the process of using the new 
technologies, overcoming obstacles and finding more adequate procedures, routines 
and structures. The emerging heuristic routines and approaches are gradually 
internalised by engineers and managers, investors and bankers, sales and 
advertising people, entrepreneurs and consumers. In time, a shared logic is 
established; a new ‘common sense’ is accepted for investment decisions as well as for 
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consumer choice. The old ideas are unlearned and the new ones become ‘normal’.” 
(Perez, 2010: 194) 
Just to illustrate, the examples of such paradigmatic changes are the (first) industrial 
revolution; the age of steam and railways; the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering; 
the age of oil, automobile, and mass production; and more recently the age of info-
communications. 
Some of these considerations might be useful when analysing social innovations in a 
qualitative way. Yet, compared to technological innovations, it is likely to be even more 
difficult to establish the degree of novelty of a given social innovation. But the degree of 
novelty seems to be of lesser importance in these cases: usually intellectual property rights 
are not an issue for social innovators. Of course, prestige – being inventive and obtaining 
acknowledgments for that – might play a role: it could give some impetus to be involved in 
certain social innovation projects. It is an empirical question to establish the role of prestige 
in these endeavours. 
What seems to be perhaps more relevant – but probably even more difficult than in the 
case of technological innovations – is to identify whether a given social innovation is an 
‘isolated’ new solution or – using the analogy of technology systems – a part of a new ‘social 
system’, that is, a set of socially, institutionally, organisationally, and economically 
interconnected social innovations, affecting several groups of people or an entire community 
(a neighbourhood, village, town or city) at the same time, occasionally leading to the 
emergence of new social structures, norms, institutions, behaviour, value systems and 
practices at a higher level of aggregation (e.g. sub-national regions, nations or even supra-
national regions [for example, the European Union]). 
Some aspects of the notion of techno-economic paradigms are contested among 
economists and economic historians dealing with technological innovations on the one hand, 
and this notion is probably too complex, too demanding – too far-fetched – to be applied to 
analyse social innovations, on the other. One of its features could be considered, though, as a 
useful guiding principle when analysing social innovations, namely the interconnectedness 
of technological, organisational and business model innovations, together with the 
emergence of a new, widely accepted ‘common sense’. 
Most of the indicators and indices used to compile the Summary Innovation Index (EIS, 
IUS), the Global Innovation Index and the Technology Achievement Index (UNDP, 2001) 
reflect the macro level: these components are calculated by aggregating micro level data (e.g. 
economic indicators at firm level, while education indicators at the level of individuals). In 
contrast, social innovations can be monitored (observed) at a project level, and it is hardly 
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possible to aggregate these data (observations) in a meaningful way to arrive at a macro 
level. 
 
5.2 INNOVATION ACTIVITIES, THEIR FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS AND IMPACTS 
In spite of the relatively long-established tradition in measuring business innovations and 
the significant efforts devoted to advance and standardise methods, there is a considerable 
lack of clarity whether a certain measurement or monitoring exercise (a set of indicators, 
data collection, measurement and analytical methods) is aimed at characterising (a) 
innovation activities (efforts) themselves, (b) the framework conditions (pre-requisites, 
available inputs, skills, etc.) of being innovative (or successful in innovation efforts), or (c) 
the economic, societal or environmental impacts of innovations. Given the complexity of 
innovation processes themselves, as well as that of economic, societal or environmental 
developments, it is certainly a major difficulty to attribute a certain economic, societal or 
environmental phenomenon as a direct (or major) effect of a given innovation project (or a 
set of them at an aggregated level). 
These fundamental methodological difficulties certainly apply to social innovations, too, 
perhaps even a fortiori. Again, a noteworthy issue is the lack of conscious efforts to 
distinguish between measuring (a) social innovation activities (efforts) themselves, (b) the 
framework conditions (pre-requisites, available inputs, skills, norms, values, behavioural 
patterns, etc.) of being socially innovative, and (c) the economic, societal or environmental 
impacts of social innovations. 
 
5.3 COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
There is a fairly strong – sometimes implicit, at other times rather explicit – pressure to 
devise so-called composite indicators to compress information into a single figure in order to 
compile eye-catching, easy-to-digest scoreboards. A major source of complication is choosing 
an appropriate weight to be assigned to each component. By conducting sensitivity analyses 
of the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), Grupp and Schubert (2010: 72) have 
shown how unstable the rank configuration is when the weights are changed. Besides 
assigning weights, three other ranking methods are also widely used, namely: unweighted 
averages, Benefit of the Doubt (BoD) and principal component analysis. Comparing these 
ranking methods, the authors conclude: “Not only utilizing the rankings highly sensitive to 
weighting (…), but even using accepted approaches like BoD or factor analysis may result in 
drastically changing rankings.” (ibid: 74) Hence, they propose using multidimensional 
representations, e.g. spider charts to reflect the multidimensional character of innovation 
processes and performance. That would enable analysts and policy-makers to identify 
strengths and weaknesses, that is, more precise targets for policy actions. (ibid: 77) 
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Other researchers also emphasise the need for a sufficiently detailed characterisation of 
innovation processes. For example, a family of five indicators – R&D, design, technological, 
skill, and innovation intensities – offers a more diversified picture on innovativeness than 
the Summary Innovation Index of the EIS. (Laestadius et al., 2005) Using Norwegian data 
they demonstrate that the suggested method can capture variety in knowledge formation and 
innovativeness both within and between sectors. It thus supports a more accurate 
understanding of creativity and innovativeness inside and across various sectors, directs 
policy-makers’ attention to this diversity (suppressed by the OECD classification of sectors), 
and thus can better serve policy needs. 
These considerations do seem to apply to social innovations, too. 
 
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reviewed business innovation indicators from theoretical and policy 
perspectives. It has discussed two widely used sets of innovation indicators, their context and 
shortcomings and also considered if they can be followed as a ‘model’ when designing social 
innovation indicators. 
The main findings can be summarised as follows. Various economics paradigms treat 
(business) innovation (if not neglect it altogether) in diametrically different ways: they 
consider different notions as crucial ones (e.g. risk vs. uncertainty, information vs. various 
forms, types and sources of knowledge, skills and learning capabilities and processes); offer 
diverse justifications (policy rationales) for state interventions; interpret the significance of 
various types of inputs, efforts, and results differently, and thus – implicitly – identify 
different ‘targets’ for measurement, monitoring and analytical purposes (what phenomena, 
inputs, capacities, processes, outcomes and impacts are to be measured and assessed). 
The science-push model of innovation, reinforced by the sophisticated – and thus 
appealing and compelling – models of mainstream economics emphasises the economic 
impacts of R&D-based innovation efforts, advances the market failure argument and the 
concomitant set of policy advice. Hence it focuses the attention of decision-makers and 
analysts to the so-called ST mode of innovation. Measurement and monitoring systems 
influenced by this way of thinking – most notably the Innovation Union Scoreboard of the 
European Commission, but to a significant extent several other attempts, too, e.g. the Global 
Innovation Index, and the Technology Achievement Index compiled for the 2001 edition of 
the Human Development Report – tend to pay attention mainly to the ST mode of 
innovation, at the expense of the so-called DUI mode of innovation. It is a major concern, 
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however, as the latter one is equally important from the point of view of enhancing 
productivity, creating jobs and improving competitiveness. 
In contrast, evolutionary economics of innovation – in line with the networked model of 
innovation – stresses the systemic nature of innovation and thus advocates rectifying any 
systemic failure that hinders the generation, circulation and exploitation of any type of 
knowledge required for successful innovation processes. This way of thinking has influenced 
the measurement and monitoring practices of the European Commission or the OECD to a 
significantly lesser extent than mainstream economics. 
In sum, the IUS indicators in principle could be useful in settings where the dominant 
mode of innovation is the ST mode. In practice, however, both the ST and DUI modes of 
innovation are fairly important. (Jensen et al., 2007) Moreover, the so-called Summary 
Innovation Index – calculated from the IUS indicators – does not provide sufficient 
information to assess a given innovation system: its low value could reflect either a low level 
of innovation activities altogether or a low level of R&D-based innovation activities (while 
other types of innovations are abundant). Yet, that is a fairly important distinction both from 
an analytical and a practical (policy) point of view: these two innovation systems are 
fundamentally different. Analysts and policy-makers dealing with innovation, therefore, 
should pay attention to both R&D-based (ST) and non-R&D-based (DUI) innovations. 
Further, while social innovations can certainly rely on R&D-based technological 
innovations, their essence tends to be organisational, managerial and behavioural changes. 
The IUS indicators do not capture these types of changes. More generally, analysts and 
decision-makers should be aware of the diversity of social innovations, too, in terms of their 
nature, drivers, objectives, actors, and process characteristics. 
An assessment of the 81 indicators used to compile the Global Innovation Index has 
shown that it would not be a fruitful effort to rely on any of those indicators to describe and 
characterise social innovations. 
The Technology Achievement Index, presented in the 2001 edition of the Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 2001), has not been discussed in this paper, but it is worth 
recalling that it does not offer a promising approach, either. It is not a comprehensive 
measure: it considers only certain types of technological achievements and not necessarily 
those that are the most relevant from the point of view of human development. (Chiappero-
Martinetti, 2015; see also Desai et al., 2002) 
Some more general methodological lessons, however, can be distilled from the efforts 
devoted to measure business innovations. The first one concerns the use of composite 
indicators. Scoreboards and league tables compiled following the science-push logic, based 
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on a composite indicator to establish rankings, and published by supranational 
organisations, can easily lead to ‘lock-in’ situations. National policy-makers – and 
politicians, in particular – are likely to pay much more attention to their country’s position 
on a scoreboard than to nuanced assessments or policy recommendations in lengthy 
documents, and hence this inapt logic is ‘diffused’ and strengthened at the national level, too, 
preventing policy learning and devising appropriate policies. Despite the likely original 
intention, that is, to broaden the horizon of decision-makers by offering internationally 
comparable data, these scoreboards and league tables strengthen a narrow-minded, 
simplifying approach. 
In other words, given the diversity among innovation systems, one should be very careful 
when trying to draw policy lessons from the ‘rank’ of a country as ‘measured’ by a composite 
indicator. A scoreboard can only be constructed by using the same set of indicators across all 
countries, and by applying an identical method to calculate the composite index. Yet, it is 
important to realise that poor performance signalled by a composite indicator, and leading to 
a low rank on a certain scoreboard, does not automatically identify the area(s) necessitating 
the most urgent policy actions. 
In contrast, a high rank on a scoreboard, e.g. Sweden’s first place on the 2013 Innovation 
Union Scoreboard does not necessarily reflect a satisfactory performance. By taking into 
account the input and output nature of various IUS indicators Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia (2015) calculated the productivity of national innovation systems covered by 
the IUS and using this assessment – which is, no doubt, highly relevant from a policy point 
of view – Sweden ranks a mere 24. 
Analysts and policy-makers, therefore, need to avoid the trap of paying too much 
attention to simplifying ranking exercises. Instead, it is of utmost importance to conduct 
detailed, thorough comparative analyses, identifying the reasons for a disappointing 
performance, as well as the sources of – opportunities for – balanced, and sustainable, socio-
economic development. 
Second, the degree of novelty and the unit of analysis are interrelated issues when 
business innovations are surveyed. It looks a rather difficult task to establish the degree of 
novelty of a given social innovation. Actually, this issue seems to be of lesser importance in 
these cases: intellectual property rights are seldom an issue for social innovators. Prestige – 
obtained by being acknowledged as a creative social innovator – might, however, play a role: 
it could be perceived as an incentive to initiate social innovation projects. No doubt, it is an 
empirical question to establish the role of prestige in these endeavours. 
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It could be also an interesting  – but certainly a demanding – research question to 
identify whether a given social innovation is a standalone new solution or – using the 
analogy of technology systems – a part of a new ‘social system’, that is, a set of socially, 
institutionally, organisationally, and economically interconnected social innovations, 
affecting several groups of people or an entire community (a neighbourhood, village, town or 
city) at the same time, occasionally leading to the emergence of new social structures, norms, 
institutions, behaviour, value systems and practices at a higher level of aggregation (e.g. sub-
national regions, nations or even supra-national regions [for example, the European 
Union]). 
Efforts aimed at measuring social innovation cannot rely a similarly long tradition. The 
TEPSIE project has been a significant effort to this end. Although the proposed TEPSIE 
framework for measuring social innovation (Bund et al., 2013) has not been analysed in this 
paper, it should be noted that its first pillar, called entrepreneurial activity is not specific to 
social innovation, on the one hand, and somewhat neglects non-entrepreneurial social 
innovation activities, on the other. Its second pillar, called field-specific output and 
outcomes, offers useful hints, but we are faced by the usual attribution problem in the case of 
social innovations, too. The third pillar is concerned with framework conditions. The 
structure of the TEPSIE indicators prompts a more general caveat: analysts and policy-
makers need to be aware of the differences between measuring (a) social innovation 
activities (efforts) themselves, (b) the framework conditions (pre-requisites, available inputs, 
skills, norms, values, behavioural patterns, etc.) of being socially innovative, and (c) the 
economic, societal or environmental impacts of social innovations. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Arrow, K.J. (1962): The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, The Review of 
Economic Studies, 29 (3): 155–173 
Balconi, M., S. Brusoni, L. Orsenigo (2010): In defence of the linear model: An essay, 
Research Policy, 39 (1), 1–13 
Baumol, W.J. (2002): The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the growth miracle 
of capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Baumol, W., R. Litan, C. Schramm (2007): Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the 
Economics of Growth and Prosperity, New Haven: Yale University Press 
Bender, G., D. Jacobson, P.L. Robertson (eds) (2005): Non-Research-Intensive Industries in 
the Knowledge Economy, Perspectives on Economic and Social Integration – Journal for 
Mental Changes, special issue, XI (1–2) 
Bleda, M. and P. del Río (2013): The market failure and the systemic failure rationales in 
technological innovation systems, Research Policy, 42 (5): 1039–1052 
Bund, E., D-K. Hubrich, B. Schmitz, G. Mildenberger, G. Krlev (2013): Blueprint of social 
innovation metrics – contributions to an understanding of opportunities and challenges of 
social innovation measurement, deliverable 2.4 of the TEPSIE project: The theoretical, 
 
 
31 
empirical and policy foundations for building social innovation in Europe, European 
Commission 7th Framework Programme 
Bush, V. (1945): Science: the Endless Frontier, Washington DC: US Government Printing 
Office 
Caraça, J., B-Å. Lundvall, S. Mendonça (2009): The changing role of science in the 
innovation process: From Queen to Cinderella?, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 76 (6): 861–867 
Castellacci, F. (2008a): Innovation and the competitiveness of industries: Comparing the 
mainstream and the evolutionary approaches, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 75 (7): 984–1006 
Castellacci, F. (2008b): Technological paradigms, regimes and trajectories: Manufacturing 
and service industries in a new taxonomy of sectoral patterns of innovation, Research 
Policy, 37 (6–7): 978–994 
Chiappero-Martinetti, E. (2015): Relationship between innovation/technology and human 
development, contribution to WP3 of the CrESSI project, Pavia: mimeo 
Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO (2014): The Global Innovation Index 2014: The 
Human Factor in Innovation, Fontainebleau, Ithaca, and Geneva: Cornell University, 
INSEAD and WIPO 
Desai, M., S. Fukuda-Parr, J. Johansson, F. Sagasti, (2002): Measuring Technology 
Achievement of Nations and the Capacity to Participate in the Network Age, Journal of 
Human Development, 3 (1): 95–122 
Di Stefano, G., A. Gambardella, G. Verona (2012): Technology push and demand pull 
perspectives in innovation studies: Current findings and future research directions, 
Research Policy, 41 (8): 1283–1295 
Dodgson, M. and R. Rothwell (eds) (1994): The Handbook of Industrial Innovation, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Dodgson, M., D.M. Gann, N. Phillips (eds) (2014): The Oxford Handbook of Innovation 
Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Dosi, G. (1988a): The nature of the innovative process, in: Dosi et al. (eds) (1988), pp. 221–
238 
Dosi, G. (1988b): Sources, procedures and microeconomic effects of innovation, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 24 (4): 1120–1171 
Dosi, G., C. Freeman, R.R. Nelson, G. Silverberg, L. Soete (eds) (1988): Technical Change 
and Economic Theory, London: Pinter 
EC (2002): 2002 European Innovation Scoreboard, Technical Paper No 6, Methodology 
Report, Brussels: European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General 
EC (2003a): European Innovation Scoreboard 2003, CORDIS focus supplement No. 20, 
Luxembourg: European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General 
EC (2003b): 2003 European Innovation Scoreboard, Technical Paper No 1, Indicators and 
Definitions, Brussels: European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General 
EC (2004): 2004 European Innovation Scoreboard, Methodology Report, Brussels: 
European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General 
EC (2005): Methodology Report on European Innovation Scoreboard 2005, Brussels: 
European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General 
EC (2009): European Innovation Scoreboard 2008: Comparative analysis of innovation 
performance, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
EC (2010): European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) 2009: Comparative analysis of 
innovation performance, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 
 
 
32 
EC (2012): Innovation Union Scoreboard 2011, Directorate-General for Enterprise and 
Industry, Brussels: European Commission 
EC (2013a): Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013, Directorate-General for Enterprise and 
Industry, Brussels: European Commission 
EC (2013b): Research and Innovation performance in EU Member States and Associated 
countries: Innovation Union progress at country level, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities 
EC (2013c): State of the Innovation Union 2012: Accelerating change, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities 
EC (2013d): European Competitiveness Report 2013: Towards Knowledge-driven 
Reindustrialisation, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 
EC (2014): Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, Directorate-General for Enterprise and 
Industry, Brussels: European Commission 
EC (2015): Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014, Directorate-General for Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Brussels: European Commission 
Edquist, C. (2011): Design of innovation policy through diagnostic analysis: identification of 
systemic problems or (failures), Industrial and Corporate Change, 20 (6): 1725–1753 
Edquist, C. (ed.) (1997): Systems of Innovations: Technologies, institutions and 
organizations, London: Pinter 
Edquist, C. and J.M. Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2015): The Innovation Union Scoreboard is 
Flawed: The case of Sweden – not being the innovation leader of the EU, CIRCLE Papers 
in Innovation Studies, No. 2015/16 
Ergas, H. (1986): Does Technology Policy Matter? Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS 
Papers No. 29, Brussels 
Ergas, H. (1987): The importance of technology policy, in: Dasgupta, P., Stoneman, P. (eds): 
Economic Policy and Technological Performance, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, pp. 51–
96 
Fagerberg, J., D.C. Mowery, R.R. Nelson (eds) (2005): The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Fagerberg. J., M. Fosaas, M. Bell, B. Martin (2011): Christopher Freeman: social science 
entrepreneur, Research Policy, 40 (7): 897–916 
Fagerberg, J., H.  Landström, B. Martin (2012): Innovation: Exploring the knowledge base, 
Research Policy, 41 (7): 1132–1153 
Foray, D. (ed.) (2009): The New Economics of Technology Policy, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar 
Freeman, C. (1991): Networks of innovators, a synthesis of research issues, Research Policy, 
20 (5): 499–514 
Freeman, C. (1994): The economics of technical change: A critical survey, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 18 (5): 463–514 
Freeman, C. (1995): The “National System of Innovation” in historical perspective, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19 (1): 5–24 
Freeman, C. and L. Soete (1997): The Economics of Industrial Innovation (3rd edition), 
London: Pinter 
Godin, B. (2006): The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an 
Analytical Framework, Science, Technology & Human Values, 31 (6): 639–667 
Godin, B. (2008): The moral economy of technology indicators, in: Hirsch-Kreinsen, H. and 
D. Jacobson (eds) (2008), pp. 64–84 
Grupp, H. (1998): Foundations of the Economics of Innovation: Theory, measurement and 
practice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
 
33 
Grupp, H. and T. Schubert (2010): Review and new evidence on composite innovation 
indicators for evaluating national performance, Research Policy, 39 (1): 67–78 
Hall, B.H. and N. Rosenberg (eds) (2010): Economics of Innovation, Amsterdam: North-
Holland 
Havas, A. (2015a): The persistent high-tech myth in the EC policy circles: Implications for 
the EU10 countries, Institute of Economics CERS HAS Discussion Papers MT-DP – 
2015/17 
Havas, A. (2015b): How does social innovation challenge neo-classical assumptions 
regarding technological innovation? in: C. Houghton Budd, C.W.M. Naastepad, and C. P. 
van Beers (eds): Report Contrasting CrESSI’s Approach of Social Innovation with that of 
Neoclassical Economics, CrESSI D1.3, pp. 40–46 
Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997): Revision of the High-Technology Sector and Product 
Classification, OECD STI Working Papers, 1997/2 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, H. and D. Jacobson (eds) (2008): Innovation in Low-Tech Firms and 
Industries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, H. and I. Schwinge (eds) (2014): Knowledge-intensive Entrepreneurship 
in Low-Tech Industries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, H., D. Jacobson, S. Laestadius (eds) (2005): Low Tech Innovation in the 
Knowledge Economy, Frankfurt: Peter Lang 
Hirsch-Kreinsen, H., D. Jacobson, S. Laestadius, K. Smith (2005): Low and Medium 
Technology Industries in the Knowledge Economies: The Analytical Issues, in: Hirsch-
Kreinsen et al. (eds) (2005), pp. 11–29 
Hollanders, H. and S. Tarantola (2011): Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010 – Methodology 
report, ProInno Europe, InnoMetrics 
Jensen, M.B., B. Johnson, E. Lorenz, B-Å. Lundvall (2007): Forms of knowledge and modes 
of innovation, Research Policy, 36 (5): 680–693 
Kaloudis, A., T. Sandven, K. Smith (2005): Structural change, growth and innovation: The 
roles of medium and low-tech industries, 1980–2002, in: Bender et al. (eds) (2005), pp. 
49–73 
Klevorick, A.K., R.C. Levin, R.R. Nelson, S.G. Winter (1995): On the sources and significance 
of interindustry differences in technical opportunities, Research Policy, 24 (2): 185–205 
Kline, S.J. and N. Rosenberg (1986): An Overview of Innovation, in: Landau, R., Rosenberg, 
N. (eds): The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth, 
Washington: National Academy Press, pp. 275–305 
Laestadious, S., T.E. Pedersen, T. Sandven (2005): Towards a new understanding of 
innovativeness – and of innovation based indicators, in: Bender et al. (eds) (2005), pp. 75–
121 
Lazonick, W. (2013): The Theory of Innovative Enterprise: Methodology, Ideology, and 
Institutions, in: J.K. Moudud, C. Bina, P.L. Mason (eds): Alternative Theories of 
Competition: Challenges to the Orthodoxy, London: Routledge, pp. 127–159 
Lundvall, B-Å. (ed.) (1992): National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter 
Lundvall, B-Å. and S. Borrás (1999): The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications for 
Innovation Policy, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities 
Malerba, F. (2002): Sectoral systems of innovation and production, Research Policy, 31 (2): 
247–264 
Martin, B. (2012): The evolution of science policy and innovation studies, Research Policy, 
41 (7): 1219–1239 
 
 
34 
Mendonça, S. (2009): Brave old world: Accounting for ‘high-tech’ knowledge in ‘low-tech’ 
industries, Research Policy, 38 (3): 470–482 
MERIT and EC JRC (2006): European Innovation Scoreboard 2006: Comparative analysis 
of innovation performance, ProInno Europe, InnoMetrics 
MERIT and EC JRC (2008): European Innovation Scoreboard 2007: Comparative analysis 
of innovation performance, ProInno Europe, InnoMetrics 
Metcalfe, S. (1998): Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction, London: Routledge 
Mowery, D.C. (2009): Plus ça change: Industrial R&D in the “third industrial revolution”, 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 18 (1): 1–50 
Mowery, D.C. and R.R. Nelson (eds) (1999): Sources of Industrial Leadership: Studies of 
Seven Industries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Nelson, R.R. (1995): Recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 33 (1): 48–90 
Nelson, R.R. (ed.) (1993): National Innovation Systems: A comparative study, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
OECD (1992): TEP: The Key Relationships, Paris: OECD 
OECD (1998): New Rationale and Approaches in Technology and Innovation Policy, STI 
Review, No. 22 
OECD (2001): Innovative Networks: Co-operation in national innovation systems, Paris: 
OECD 
OECD (2002): Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and 
Experimental Development, 6th edition, Paris: OECD 
OECD (2005): Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, 
3rd edition, Paris: OECD 
Pavitt, K. (1984): Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and theory, 
Research Policy, 13 (6): 343–373 
Pavitt, K. (1999): Technology, Management and Systems of Innovation, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 
Peneder, M. (1999): The Austrian Paradox: “Old” structures but high performance? Austrian 
Economic Quarterly, 4 (4): 239–247 
Peneder, M. (2010): Technological regimes and the variety of innovation behaviour: Creating 
integrated taxonomies of firms and sectors, Research Policy, 39 (3): 323–334 
Perez, C. (2010): Technological revolutions and techno-economic paradigms, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 34 (1): 185–202 
Robertson, P. and K. Smith (2008): Distributed knowledge bases in low- and medium 
technology industries, in: Hirsch-Kreinsen, H., Jacobson, D. (eds) (2008), pp. 93–117 
Robertson, P., K. Smith, N. von Tunzelmann (2009): Innovation in low- and medium-
technology industries, Research Policy, 38 (3): 441–446 
Rosenberg, N. (1982): Inside the black box: Technology and economics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Sandven, T., K. Smith, A. Kaloudis (2005): Structural change, growth and innovation: the 
roles of medium and low-tech industries, 1980–2000, in: Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. (eds) 
(2005), pp. 31–59 
Smith, K. (2000): Innovation as a Systemic Phenomenon: Rethinking the Role of Policy, 
Enterprise & Innovation Management Studies, 1 (1): 73–102 
Smith, K. (2002): What is the “Knowledge Economy”? Knowledge intensity and distributed 
knowledge bases, UNU/INTECH Discussion Paper Series, 2002-6 
Smith, K. (2005): Measuring Innovation, in: Fagerberg et al. (eds) (2005), pp. 148–177 
 
 
35 
Tidd, J., J. Bessant, K. Pavitt (1997): Managing Innovation: Integrating technological, 
market and organizational change, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
UNDP (2001): Human Development Report: Making new technologies work for human 
development, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
von Hippel, E. (1988): The Sources of Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
von Tunzelman, N. (1995): Technology and Industrial Progress: The foundations of 
economic growth, Aldershot: Edward Elgar 
von Tunzelmann, N. and V. Acha (2005): Innovation in “Low-Tech” Industries, in: Fagerberg 
et al. (eds) (2005), pp. 407–432 
  
 
 
36 
APPENDIX 1: SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR INNOVATION 
Figure A1 
Highly important ‘business’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2006-2008 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2008 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
Figure A2 
Highly important ‘scientific’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2006-2008 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2008 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
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Figure A3 
Highly important ‘business’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2008-2010 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2010 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
Figure A4 
Highly important ‘scientific’ sources of information for product and process 
innovation, EU members, 2008-2010 
 
Source: Eurostat, CIS2010 
Note: Data for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in this figure. 
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APPENDIX 2: THE EIS AND IUS INDICATORS 
The indicators used in particular editions of the EIS and IUS are presented and assessed in 
this Appendix, except for the first (2003) and last (2015) editions, which are presented in the 
main body of this report. The indicators used in 2006 and 2007 were identical, and thus are 
presented in a single table (Table A4). Further, the indicators used for the 2010, 2011 and 
2013 editions of the Innovation Union Scoreboard were also identical, and thus these are 
presented in Table A7.18 
                                                        
18 The numbering convention was changed in 2013: in that year IUS 2013 was published, while continuing the 
previous convention it would have been called IUS 2012. 
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Table A1 
The 2003 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1 Human resources 
S&E graduates (ISCED 5a and above) per 1000 population aged 20-
29 
X  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) 
X  
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) X  
2 Knowledge creation 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) X  
USPTO high-tech patent applications (per million population) X  
EPO patent applications (per million population) x  
USPTO patents granted (per million population) x  
3 Transmission and application of knowledge   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of manufacturing and % of services 
SMEs) 
b b 
SMEs involved in innovation co-operation (% of manufacturing and 
% of services SMEs) 
b b 
Innovation expenditures (% of all turnover in manufacturing and % 
of all turnover in services) 
b b 
4 Innovation finance, output and markets 
Share of high-tech venture capital investment X  
Share of early stage venture capital in GDP x  
Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of all turnover in manufacturing 
and % of all turnover in services) 
b b 
Sales of ‘new to the firm but not new to the market’ products (% of all 
turnover in manufacturing and % of all turnover in services) 
b b 
Internet access/ use (composite of home internet access and the 
share of SMEs with own website) 
b b 
ICT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
Share of manufacturing value-added in high-tech X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the detailed definition of indicators, EC (2003b) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A2 
The 2004 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1 Human resources 
S&E graduates (ISCED 5a and above) per 1000 population aged 20-
29 
X  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) 
X  
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) X  
2 Knowledge creation 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) X  
USPTO high-tech patents granted (per million population) X  
EPO patent applications (per million population) x  
USPTO patents granted (per million population) x  
3 Transmission and application of knowledge   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) b b 
SMEs involved in innovation co-operation (% of all SMEs) b b 
Innovation expenditures (% of all turnover) b b 
Share of SMEs that use non-technical change (% of all SMEs)  x 
4 Innovation finance, output and markets 
Share of high-tech venture capital investment X  
Share of early stage venture capital in GDP x  
Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of all turnover) b b 
Sales of ‘new to the firm but not new to the market’ products (% of all 
turnover) 
b b 
Internet access/ use (composite of home and firms’ internet access) b b 
ICT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
Share of manufacturing value-added in high-tech X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the detailed definition of indicators, EC (2004) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A3 
The 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1 Innovation drivers 
New S&E graduates (ISCED 5a and above) per 1000 population aged 
20-29 
X  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per 100 
population) 
b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 
having completed at least upper secondary education) 
b b 
2 Knowledge creation 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D (% of manufacturing 
R&D expenditures) 
X  
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation x  
Share of university R&D expenditures financed by business sector X  
3 Innovation & entrepreneurship   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) b b 
Innovative SMEs co-operating with others (% of SMEs) b b 
Innovation expenditures (% of all turnover) b b 
Early stage venture capital (% of GDP) x  
ICT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
SMEs using non-technical change (% of all SMEs)  x 
4 Application 
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) X  
Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports X  
Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of all turnover) b b 
Sales of ‘new to the firm but not new to the market’ products (% of all 
turnover) 
b b 
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) 
X  
5 Intellectual property   
EPO patents per million population x  
USPTO patents per million population x  
Triadic patent families per million population x  
New community trademarks per million population b b 
New community industrial designs per million population b b 
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the detailed definition of indicators, EC (2005) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A4 
The 2006 and 2007 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1 Innovation drivers 
New S&E graduates (ISCED 5a and above) per 1000 population aged 
20-29 
X  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per 100 
population) 
b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 
having completed at least upper secondary education) 
b b 
2 Knowledge creation 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D (% of manufacturing 
R&D expenditures) 
X  
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation x  
3 Innovation & entrepreneurship   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) b b 
Innovative SMEs co-operating with others (% of SMEs) b b 
Innovation expenditures (% of all turnover) b b 
Early stage venture capital (% of GDP) x  
ICT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
SMEs using non-technical change (% of all SMEs)  x 
4 Application 
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) X  
Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports X  
Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of all turnover) b b 
Sales of ‘new to the firm but not new to the market’ products (% of all 
turnover) 
b b 
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of 
total workforce) 
X  
5 Intellectual property   
EPO patents per million population x  
USPTO patents per million population x  
Triadic patent families per million population x  
New community trademarks per million population b b 
New community industrial designs per million population b b 
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the list of indicators, MERIT and EC JRC (2006) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A5 
The 2008 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1.1 Human resources 
S&E and SSH graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 (first stage of 
tertiary education) 
x  
S&E and SSH doctorate graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 (second 
stage of tertiary education) 
x  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 having 
completed at least upper secondary education) 
b b 
1.2 Finance and support 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Venture capital (% of GDP) x  
Private credit (relative to GDP) b b 
Broadband access by firms (% of firms) b b 
2.1 Firm investments   
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
IT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures (% of turnover)  x 
2.2 Linkages & entrepreneurship   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others (% of SMEs) b b 
Firm renewal (SME entries plus exits) (% of SMEs) b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
2.3 Throughputs   
EPO patents per million population x  
Community trademarks per million population b b 
Community designs per million population b b 
Technology Balance of Payments flows (% of GDP) X  
3.1 Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations (% of SMEs) b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations (% of SMEs)  X 
Resource efficiency innovators [unweighted average of: Share of innovators 
where innovation has significantly reduced labour costs (% of firms) and 
Share of innovators where innovation has significantly reduced the use of 
materials and energy (% of firms)] 
b b 
3.2 Economic effects   
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total 
workforce) 
X  
Employment in knowledge-intensive services (% of total workforce) X  
Medium and high-tech manufacturing exports (% of total exports X  
Knowledge-intensive services exports (% of total services exports) X  
New-to-market sales (% of turnover) b b 
New-to-firm sales (% of turnover) b b 
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the list of indicators, EC (2009a) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A6 
The 2009 European Innovation Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1.1 Human resources 
S&E and SSH graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 (first stage of 
tertiary education) 
x  
S&E and SSH doctorate graduates per 1000 population aged 20-29 (second 
stage of tertiary education) 
x  
Population with tertiary education (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class) b b 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 having 
completed at least upper secondary education) 
b b 
1.2 Finance and support 
Public R&D expenditures (GERD – BERD) (% of GDP) X  
Venture capital (% of GDP) x  
Private credit (relative to GDP) b b 
Broadband access by firms (% of firms) b b 
2.1 Firm investments   
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (% of GDP) X  
IT expenditures (% of GDP) b b 
Non-R&D innovation expenditures (% of turnover)  x 
2.2 Linkages & entrepreneurship   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others (% of SMEs) b b 
Firm renewal (SME entries plus exits) (% of SMEs) b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
2.3 Throughputs   
EPO patents per million population x  
Community trademarks per million population b b 
Community designs per million population b b 
Technology Balance of Payments flows (% of GDP) X  
3.1 Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations (% of SMEs) b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations (% of SMEs)  X 
Share of innovators where innovation has significantly reduced labour costs 
(% of firms) 
b b 
Share of innovators where innovation has significantly reduced the use of 
materials and energy (% of firms) 
b b 
3.2 Economic effects   
Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total 
workforce) 
X  
Employment in knowledge-intensive services (% of total workforce) X  
Medium and high-tech manufacturing exports (% of total exports X  
Knowledge-intensive services exports (% of total services exports) X  
New-to-market sales (% of turnover) b b 
New-to-firm sales (% of turnover) b b 
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the list of indicators, EC (2010a) 
Notes: Public R&D expenditures do not equal to GERD – BERD; rather, it should be the sum of government-
funded parts of BERD, GOVERD, and HERD 
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Table A7 
The 2010, 2011, and 2013 Innovation Union Scoreboard indicators 
 
Relevance 
for R&D- 
based 
innovation 
Relevance 
for non-
R&D- 
based 
innovation 
1.1 Human resources 
New doctorate graduates (ISCED 6) per 1000 population aged 25-34 X  
Percentage population aged 30-34 having completed tertiary 
education 
b b 
Percentage youth aged 20-24 having attained at least upper 
secondary level education 
b b 
1.2 Open, excellent and attractive research systems 
International scientific co-publications per million population X  
Scientific publications among the top 10% most cited publications 
worldwide as % of total scientific publications of the country 
X  
Non-EU doctorate studentsi as a % of all doctorate students X  
1.3 Finance and support 
R&D expenditure in the public sector as % of GDP X  
Venture capital investment as % of GDP x  
2.1 Firm investments 
R&D expenditure in the business sector as % of GDP X  
Non-R&D innovation expenditures as % of turnover  X 
2.2 Linkages & entrepreneurship 
SMEs innovating in-house as % of SMEs b b 
Innovative SMEs collaborating with others as % of SMEs b b 
Public-private co-publications per million population X  
2.3 Intellectual assets 
PCT patents applications per billion GDP (in PPS€) X  
PCT patent applications in societal challenges per billion GDP (in 
PPS€) (environment-related technologies; health) 
X  
Community trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
Community designs per billion GDP (in PPS€)  X 
3.1 Innovators 
SMEs introducing product or process innovations as % of SMEs b b 
SMEs introducing marketing or organisational innovations as % of 
SMEs 
 X 
3.2 Economic effects 
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities (manufacturing and 
services) as % of total employment 
x  
Contribution of medium and high-tech product exports to the trade 
balance 
x  
Knowledge-intensive services exports as % total service exports x  
Sales of new to market and new to firm innovations as % of turnover b b 
License and patent revenues from abroad as % of GDP X  
Legend: 
X: only relevant 
x: mainly relevant 
b: relevant for both types 
Source: own compilation, drawing on the detailed definition of indicators, Hollanders and Tarantola (2011) 
i It is a somewhat strict definition of openness, which only takes into account non-EU doctorate students. 
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APPENDIX 3: THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX INDICATORS 
The first, 2007 edition of the GII has been composed of the following indicators, grouped 
into eight “pillars”, of which 5 meant to represent inputs, while 3 were to reflect on outputs: 
 
INPUTS 
Institutions and Policies 
Independence of judiciary 
Demanding regulatory standards 
Prevalence of laws relating to ICT 
Quality of IPR 
Soundness of banks 
Quality of scientific research institutions [The quality of organisations is not an 
institution       (“rule of the game”); A.H.]  
Quality of management/business schools [Same as above; A.H.] 
Legal obstacles to foreign labour 
Time required to start a business 
Time required to obtain licenses 
Rigidity of employment index 
Investor protection index 
ICT priority for government 
Human Capacity 
Brain drain 
Quality of human resource approach 
Quality of maths and science education 
Graduates in engineering 
Graduates in science 
Population 15-64 
Urban population 
Schools connected to the internet  [At best indirectly – and vaguely – related to 
      human capacity; A.H.]] 
General and ICT Infrastructure 
Quality of general infrastructure 
Quality of national transport network 
Quality of air transport 
Fixed line penetration 
Mobile penetration 
Internet penetration 
International bandwidth 
ICT expenditure 
Personal computer penetration 
Mobile price basket    [This is access to infrastructure; A.H.] 
Business, Markets and Capital Flows 
Access to loans 
Sophistication of financial markets 
Issuing shares in local share market 
Corporate governance 
Buyer sophistication 
Customer orientation of firms 
Domestic credit to private sector 
FDI net inflows 
Gross private capital flows 
 
 
47 
Gross capital formation 
Extent of clusters 
Commercial services imports 
Manufactured imports 
Private investment in ICT   [Why among these indicators? A.H.] 
Informal economy estimate 
Technology and Process Sophistication 
Country’s level of technology 
E-Participation index 
E-Government index 
Government procurement of advanced technology 
Internet use by businesses 
Competition among ISP providers  [Why among these indicators? A.H.] 
Company technology absorption 
Telecom revenue    [Why among these indicators? A.H.] 
Secure internet servers per 1,000 people 
Spending on R&D 
Royalty and license fee payments 
Business/university R&D collaboration 
 
OUTPUTS 
Knowledge 
Local specialised research and training [Not output; A.H.] 
Nature of competitive advantage  [Not output; A.H.] 
Quality of production process technology [Not output; A.H.] 
High-tech exports 
Manufactured exports 
ICT exports 
Insurance and financial services 
Patents registered (domestic and non-domestic) [Not output; A.H.] 
Royalty and license fee receipts 
Competitiveness 
Growth of exports to neighbouring countries 
Intensity of local competition 
Reach of exporting in international markets 
Commercial services export 
Merchandise exports 
Goods exported 
Service exports 
Listed domestic companies   [Why among these indicators? A.H.] 
Wealth 
Final consumption expenditure 
GDP per capita, PPP 
GDP growth rate 
Industry, value added 
Manufacturer, value added 
Services, value added 
International migration stock 
Value of stocks traded 
FDI net outflows 
 
